We checked every script Explore serves. Here is what we found.
Following the 16 November supply-chain attack on Optimizely Web Experimentation customers.
In short. On 16 November, an attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Experimentation product and added malicious JavaScript to customer projects. Optimizely’s servers then delivered that code to visitors of at least 178 organisations, according to Report URI. Optimizely says it has fixed the vulnerability and removed the code (status page).
Our security team has checked all code that Explore delivers to customer websites. We found no trace of the malicious code, and the code Explore serves matches what each customer saved.
What we checked
- Every experiment and variation.
- Pop-ups and overlays.
- Visitor-exclusion rules.
- Cached copies served from our servers.
For each, we compared what Explore delivers to visitors with what the customer saved in their account. They match.
Why this matters beyond one vendor
This attack did not break the testing tool’s code. It used a legitimate feature: a field where customers add their own JavaScript, which then runs on every page. Every client-side testing and personalisation tool, Explore included, has a path like this, because that is how experiments change a page.
So the right question for any vendor is not “were you hit?” but “who can write code that runs on my site, and how fast would an unexpected change be caught?” We would rather you ask us that directly than assume the answer. Write to us at the address below.
What we recommend, whichever testing tool you use
Protect your account
- Sign in with Google or your company single sign-on, with 2-step verification turned on.
- Review who on your team can edit Explore projects, and remove anyone who no longer needs access.
- Replace your Explore API keys if a key may have been exposed.
Protect your visitors, even if a trusted script is ever compromised
- Keep testing and marketing scripts off checkout and login pages. Take card details only through your payment provider’s hosted fields; in this attack, card details entered in a payment processor’s iframe were out of the skimmer’s reach.
- Restrict where scripts can send data, not just where they load from. Allowing a vendor’s domain in your Content Security Policy did not stop this attack, because the malicious code came from that trusted domain. A tight
connect-srcrule limits where stolen data can go. - Review the custom code in your testing projects regularly. Anything your team did not write should be removed.
If you also run Optimizely Web
Check the Project JavaScript field and any custom code in your projects for code your team did not write, ask Optimizely which of your projects were changed and when, and rotate the API tokens and integrations that can write to your account.
Our commitment
- We run regular security audits and investigate potential issues proactively.
- If anything changes these findings, we will update this page and date the update.
- Your security or procurement team can reach us directly at contact@omniconvert.com. We will answer technical questions about how Explore delivers code to your site.
Valentin Radu
CEO, Omniconvert
Update log
- : first published.